Category: International Energy Law


By Kevin Vermillion

Brazil is the largest economy in South America and the seventh largest in the world.[i] Moreover, Brazil is one of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) Nations, which some postulate will overtake the G7 economies by 2032.[ii] Brazil experienced remarkable industrialization over the last six decades, but even so, the nation faces substantial challenges due to energy source volatility.[iii] The following sections analyze Brazil’s energy background and natural gas’s role in realizing true energy stability.

Brazil’s Energy Background

Brazil’s electric grid is disproportionately dependent on hydroelectric power. As of 2012, hydroelectric power accounted for 80 percent of the installed capacity for the national power grid. [iv] While hydroelectric power is a renewable source of energy, years of low precipitation have repeatedly stressed the grid, leading to price instability. Even after ramping up fossil fuel generation, Brazil was forced to implement a strict quota system to avoid load-shedding events — also known as rolling blackouts.[v] The upcoming 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics provide additional impetuses for investments in energy production and infrastructure.[vi] To avoid industry-obstructing scenarios, Brazil sought other viable sources of power generation. The primary fuel for this new generation was to be natural gas.

Brazil’s transition to increased natural gas power generation was far from seamless. Initially, Brazil turned to its neighbor, Bolivia, to build a natural gas pipeline (GASBOL) between Bolivia and southern Brazil.[vii] Commenced in 1997 and completed by 1999, GASBOL cost 2.15 billion USD.[viii] The future seemed bright for GASBOL, but internal political turmoil in Bolivia following its 2003-2004 economic crisis began to degrade relations between Brazil and Bolivia. After the previous president fled the country after a change in leadership, Bolivian president Evo Morales nationalized all natural gas reserves as part of a broader political movement.[ix] Although Bolivians viewed the move as patriotic, it was disconcerting for Brazil, which looked to further diversify its energy portfolio via elevated domestic natural gas production.[x]

In 2006, Brazil implemented the Natural Gas Production Anticipation Plan.[xi] The goal of the plan was to increase production of natural gas in southeast Brazil — home to much of Brazil’s industry — from 15 MMcf/day in 2008 to 55 MMcf/day in 2010. [xii] Unfortunately, an illiquid credit market and strong rains undermined that plan.

The 2008 financial crisis dampened international interest in all types of investment, including Brazilian natural gas development. Simultaneously, a robust rainy period allowed the nation to fall back on hydroelectric power, further decreasing private sector interest in natural gas production.[xiii] By 2009, instead of trebled domestic production in southeast Brazil, natural gas production in the area was about one-third of production in 2006.[xiv]

LNG’s Role in Brazil

Despite many setbacks, natural gas is now on the upswing. Owing to an initiative by the National Energy Policy Council, Petrobras — Brazil’s state-controlled oil and gas corporation — laid the groundwork for building LNG import terminals.[xv] Brazil currently has two LNG import terminals: one in Pecém, in northeast Brazil, and the other in Guanabara Bay, near Rio De Janeiro in southeast Brazil.[xvi] Petrobras signed agreements for both terminals in 2007. These terminals are floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) that together process up to 21 MMcf/day.[xvii]

Additionally, another such terminal is currently under construction in Bahia, in eastern Brazil about halfway between the existing terminals. The Bahia terminal will add another 14 MMcf/day of processing infrastructure. Like the constructed facilities, the Bahia facility will connect to existing natural gas pipeline infrastructure in its respective region. As of 2011, the Pecém and Guanabara Bay terminals import LNG primarily from Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, and Qatar.[xviii]

While LNG imports have become a crucial fallback option, natural gas self-sufficiency is the ultimate goal.[xix] Brazil has made significant strides in increasing domestic natural gas production. Between 2009 and 2011, Brazil’s annual domestic production rose from 363,034 MMcf in 2009 to 850,024 MMcf in 2011 — an increase of roughly 230 percent.[xx] Nevertheless, Brazil relied on record LNG imports to meet drought-induced energy demands. In January 2013, Brazil imported over 500,000 tons of LNG — a 20 percent increase from December 2012 and an 86 percent increase from January 2012.[xxi] Moreover, Brazil paid an average of $16.50/MMBtu in January, a significant increase from $13.27/MMBtu average it paid in 2012.[xxii]

Brazil may soon become a hearty consumer of American natural gas. Recognizing robust foreign LNG demand, existing U.S. LNG terminals are looking to add export capabilities. This update is currently taking place at the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana.[xxiii] With U.S. spot prices hovering around $3.50/MMBtu, it is no wonder that there are over a dozen U.S. LNG export terminals in varying stages of development.[xxiv] Thus, U.S. gas might soon help power Brazil’s electrical grid. Combined with oil exploration off Brazil’s coast, it is easy to imagine a more interdependent energy relationship for the hemisphere’s two largest economies.

Conclusion

Brazil has a long way to go to build a robust, reliable grid that is not as susceptible to price shocks, but it is moving in the right direction. The LNG import terminals enable Brazil to pursue long-term and short-term energy agreements with far-away nations —ensuring that Brazil is not beholden to neighboring nations like Bolivia.[xxv] Thus, LNG imports provide certainty in gas availability, which encourages investment in natural gas-fired electricity generation. These plants, in turn, ensure a market for domestic gas, hopefully providing an incentive for increased domestic production.

Brazil witnessed immense growth in recent years despite a volatile energy supply. Increased domestic production of natural gas and increased LNG importation capacity help provide the reliability that manufacturers and large commercial electric consumers require. If Brazil’s policymakers are able to address these issues, its burgeoning economy may exceed investors’ already lofty expectations.

 

Kevin Vermillion graduated in 2011 from the University of Texas at Austin with degrees in Plan II Honors and History. Kevin interned with ConocoPhillips as a facilities engineer during his undergraduate career. During law school, he interned with the Railroad Commission of Texas and Mayer Brown, LLP; he will spend the upcoming summer with Jackson Walker, LLP and Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP.



[ii] Projection by Goldman Sachs experts. BRIC Countries Likely to Overtake G7 by 2032: Experts. April 2010. Available at http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/bric-countries-likely-to-overtake-g7-experts-3719/

[iv] The Dangers of Relying on Hydroelectric Power: Brazil’s Lesson.  International Business Times.  Rasheed Abou-Alsamh. April 30, 2012.  Available at http://www.ibtimes.com/dangers-relying-hydroelectric-power-brazils-lesson-1056722

[v]. Id.

[vi] Brazil government denies World Cup energy fears. Michael Place. January 23, 2013. Available at http://www.bnamericas.com/news/electricpower/government-denies-world-cup-energy-fears

[vii] GASBOL is not Brazil’s only international pipeline; Argentina and Brazil have the Paraná-Urugaiana Pipeline. Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone. David R. Mares. May 2004.  Available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=f&rct=j&url=http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/natural-gas-pipelines-in-the-southern-cone&q=Natural+Gas+Pipelines+in+the+Southern+Cone&ei=WHIZUeOhGIi8qQGB04CIDQ&usg=AFQjCNEjDb8q_LwDL-460Rn0_qH9l7Pc-A

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Liquefied Natural Gas in Brazil:  ANG’s experience in the implantation of LNG import projects. 2010. Available at http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Brazil,%20Liquefied%20Natural%20Gas,%20ANP%20import%20experience.pdf

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Id.

[xv] Id.

[xvi] World’s LNG Liquefaction Plants and Regasification Terminals: As of January 2013. January 2013. Available at http://www.globallnginfo.com/World%20LNG%20Plants%20&%20Terminals.pdf

[xvii] Petrobras’ LNG Among World’s Main Infrastructure Products. Pipeline & Gas Journal. September 2010. Available at http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/petrobras-lng-among-worlds-main-infrastructure-projects

[xviii] World LNG Report 2011. International Gas Union. 2012. Available at http://www.igu.org/igu-publications/LNG%20Report%202011.pdf

[xix] Energy and Mining Minister Edison Lobão stated that onshore reserves will enable Brazil to begin exporting LNG within five years.  Brazil Onshore Gas is New Pre-Salt: Daily.  Stephen Eisenhammer. April 30, 2012.  Available at http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/brazils-onshore-gas-reserves-a-new-pre-sal/#

[xx] Converted from 10,280,000,000 cubic meters in 2009 and 24,070,000,000 cubic meters in 2011 for unit consistency. Available at http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=br&v=136

[xxi] Brazil’s January LNG Imports Smash Country Records.  Available at http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com//News.aspx?ElementID=2c1461cb-2709-48fd-8ae1-cfd6d840637c

[xxii] Id.

[xxiii] The import terminal is adding liquefaction capabilities to its existing regasification capabilities. Sabine Pass Liquefaction Project. Available at http://www.cheniere.com/lng_industry/sabine_pass_liquefaction.shtml

[xxiv] North American LNG Import/Export Terminals: Proposed Potential. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. December 2012. Available at http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-proposed-potential.pdf

[xxv] “Bolivia accounts for 78 percent of Brazilian gas imports [including LNG].” February 28, 2012. Available at http://www.eia.gov/cabs/brazil/Full.html.

By Jamie Leader

Mr. Leader graduated from Georgetown University in 2009 with a B.A. in History and Political Economy. This summer he is clerking in Houston at Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins. He expects to receive his J.D. from the Texas School of Law in May 2012.

There are over 2 million miles of pipeline running through the United States, but a Canadian company’s plan to add just 1,600 miles to that total has created a controversy than spans from Nebraska to east Texas. The pipeline, called the Keystone XL, is controversial not for where it goes, but what it carries: crude oil extracted from tar sands. View full article »

By Thejaswini Mohan

Ms. Mohan received a LL.B. (equivalent of a J.D.) from Bangalore University and a post-graduate diploma in International Copyright Law from the National Law School of India University in 2008. After graduation, she worked as assistant in-house counsel for Infosys Technologies in Bangalore. She expects to receive her LL.M. from the Texas School of Law this May.

India is in the forefront of the emerging economies in the world. The array of investors and industrialists setting up their business interests in India has prompted Indian politicians and planners to look at the various avenues to provide a favorable and fruitful environment to lure foreign investments. The Indian government has realized that power production is first among the key avenues to achieve such foreign investments, and in this respect it has introduced the nuclear power program to provide uninterrupted power supply.

The Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement signed on October 2008 allows US companies to supply nuclear power plant parts to India. In order to be compliant with this agreement there has to be a law regulating nuclear liability. This is one of the critical requirements for the seamless trade of nuclear parts as the suppliers would have a clear understanding of their liability and allow them to estimate and prepare their insurance plan. In the absence of this civil liability or nuclear liability bill, India is isolated from the nuclear power market as the power blocks like GE and Westinghouse Electric Company are reluctant to enter the Indian market in the absence of clear-cut guidelines on liability from a nuclear accident. View full article »

By Steve Zhang

Mr. Zhang graduated from the Hebei Institute of Architectural Science and Technology with a Bachelor of Engineering in Mining Engineering, and from Peking University with a Juris Master (equivalent of the American J.D.).  Mr. Zhang worked as an associate at Lovells Beijing, and as a senior associate and in-house counsel at My Decker Capital. He expects to receive his L.L.M. from the Texas School of Law this spring.

As the first five-year commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC‘) sprints to its expiration on December 31, 2012, the Obama administration put another nail in the treaty’s coffin by inheriting Bush’s rejection of the treaty.

As a clear signal of its “disappointment at the outcome of the 2009 summit in Copenhagen” and its concerns on the “stuttering pace” of subsequent negotiations, UNFCCC is scrambling for a “contingency plan” for an imminent hiatus between expiration of the first commitment period and the entering into force of another period. Despite the urgency, there is no sign that an accord can be finalized soon to close the gap. Such a gap may create uncertainties for carbon emission trading in the foreseeable future. View full article »

The U.S. Position on LOST

By Yan Zhu

Yan Zhu received a Bachelor of Law from Shandong University in 2005, and a Master of Law from Peking University in 2008.  She is expected to receive her LL.M. from the Texas School of Law in May 2011.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”), also known as the Law of the Sea Convention, the Law of the Sea Treaty, or simply LOST, is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from 1973 through 1982 and entered into force on November 16, 1994. Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea.

Among its seventeen parts, the one that caused the most disputes is Part XI. Titled, “The Area,” this section applies to the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (“the Area”). This part was designed to govern “activities” in the Area, including all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, resources in the Area. By “resources,” it means all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nudules. Of course, energy resources, such as oil and gas, are included. View full article »

OPEC’s 50th Anniversary

By Molly Wurzer

Ms. Wurzer graduated with a B.A. in political science from the University of Texas at Dallas in 2009.  She expects to earn her J.D. from the Texas School of Law in 2012.

2010 marks an important year in the world’s oil market: the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  Since its creation, OPEC has exercised not only a large effect on the world’s oil market, but also played a role in several significant global political conflicts, including both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf War of 1990-1991.  Although the United States does not share the same ideologies as many of OPEC’s member states (think Iran and Saudi Arabia), we are highly dependent on OPEC’s choices, since the United States currently uses twenty-five percent of the world’s oil production and relies on foreign imports for sixty-five percent of its oil needs.

On September 10-14, 1960, the five Founding Members (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezula) created OPEC at the Baghdad Conference. Today, OPEC consists of twelve member countries: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. OPEC’s members produce about a third (or up to forty percent by other estimates) of the world’s daily oil output, but they possess about eighty percent of the world’s oil reserves.  In 2009, OPEC earned $571 billion on net oil export revenues, and is expected to earn $741 billion on 2010.  This enables OPEC to exercise an unprecedented amount of control over the world’s oil market. View full article »

By Tomisin Lagundoye

Tomisin received a LL.B. from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria in 2006.  Tomisin started her legal career as an intern at O.J. Bamgbose & Co. in Ibadan, Nigeria.  After receiving her license to practice law in Nigeria in 2007, Tomisin served as counsel at SimmonsCooper Partners in Victoria Island, Nigeria, and most recently as an associate at Udo Udoma & Belo-Osagie in Lagos Island, Nigeria.  Tomisin is expected to receive her LL.M. from the Texas School of Law in May 2011.

Local content in the oil and gas industry has increasingly been utilized as a tool for ensuring sustainable development in oil and gas producing countries. Local content essentially helps to promote the growth of local business and services in such countries by mandating the utilization of local goods and services in the execution of projects in the country. The local content concept may be entrenched in a country’s national policy on the oil and gas industry, contained in specific laws on local content or may be expressly set out as contractual obligations in an agreement such as a production sharing contract.

In Nigeria, the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act 2010 (the “Act”) provides an elaborate framework for the utilization of Nigerian goods and services in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Nigerian content is defined in the Act as “the quantum of composite value added to, or created in, the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, material resources and services in the oil and gas industry.” The provisions of the Act apply to all matters relating to Nigerian content in respect to all operations or transactions carried out in, or connected with, the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The Nigerian oil and gas industry refers to the totality of activities connected with the exploration, development, exploitation, transportation, and sale of Nigerian oil and gas resources including upstream and downstream oil and gas operations. The Act places an obligation on all regulatory authorities, operators, contractors, subcontractors, and other entities involved in any project, operation, activity, or transaction in the Nigerian oil and gas industry to consider Nigerian content as an important element of the overall project development and management philosophy for project execution. The term “operator” refers to the government-owned national oil company, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, its subsidiaries, joint venture partners, and any Nigerian oil and gas company – foreign or international – operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry under any petroleum arrangement. View full article »

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